CLERK2OFFICER · CAIIB BRBL MODULE D · D26

RTI Procedure: Requests, Response Clocks, Appeals and Penalties

2,607 teaching words · 25 explained questions

Module contents · Learning tools

Complete-module review edition · 9 November 2026. Independent academic acceptance and website UAT pending. Review limitations.

Chapter contents

1. Identify which clock is running

A request reaches an assistant information officer, is transferred to another authority and later receives a fee intimation. A worksheet simply adds thirty days to the first date and declares the authority late. That calculation may ignore legally relevant events. RTI has several specific response and appeal rules, so the procedural stage and facts must be established first.

Sections 5 to 11 and 18 to 20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 provide the central framework for this lesson. Central and State rules govern relevant fees and procedures. D25 explains applicability and exemptions. The learning objective is to reconstruct the route and make a reasoned response without pretending that a generic date tool decides every legal deadline.

Record receipt, recipient, transfer, information category, fee notice and payment, decision, delivery and appeal events. A document's preparation date is not always the event starting the statutory period. Preserve evidence rather than select the date most favourable to the institution or requester.

2. Making the request

Section 6 permits a written or electronic request in English, Hindi or the official language of the area, with prescribed fee and particulars of the information sought. Where the person cannot make the request in writing, reasonable assistance is required to reduce the oral request to writing. Accessibility is part of the framework, not an optional favour.

The applicant need not provide reasons or unnecessary personal details beyond contact needs. The authority should help identify a reasonably described record rather than insist on a commercial motive statement. However, the request must identify the information sought; RTI does not automatically require a new expert report answering an undefined grievance.

An original request asks for the circular used to decide an application and the recorded reasons. That can be clearer than demanding an officer justify every opinion in a new essay. The receiving team should preserve the actual wording and relevant date and acknowledge through the supported process without implying that acknowledgement guarantees disclosure.

3. Assistant officers and internal assistance

Section 5 provides the assistant-information-officer receiving and forwarding role and adds five days in computing the section 7 response period in the stated situation. An assistant's receipt should therefore be recorded accurately. The added period is not a general five-day extension available to every delayed request.

The PIO can seek assistance from another officer, who has the statutory duty and relevant deemed-PIO consequence for contravention under section 5(5). A bank's internal allocation should make the request, record owner and return date clear. Passing the file around informally does not suspend the legal process indefinitely.

For a worked routing case, a branch receives records relevant to a request handled by a central PIO. The branch should provide the requested assistance through the authorised channel, preserving accuracy and scope. It should not independently send protected records to a stranger or ignore the request because the PIO works elsewhere.

Track each RTI stageRequest and proper receipt. Response, fee or third-party process. First appeal, then relevant second appealTrack each RTI stageRequest and proper receiptResponse, fee or third-party processFirst appeal, then relevant second appealClerk2Officer · original teaching diagram · conditional examples
Track each RTI stage: Request and proper receipt. Response, fee or third-party process. First appeal, then relevant second appeal.

4. Transfer to another public authority

Section 6(3) requires transfer where the information is held by another public authority or the subject is more closely connected with its functions, with immediate information to the applicant and transfer as soon as practicable and no later than five days from receipt. It also permits the appropriate part to be transferred.

Distinguish transfer between public authorities from internal forwarding within one authority. The legal source and responsibility can differ. A bank should not call every internal email a statutory transfer or assume that a transfer permits it to abandon the parts of the request it properly holds.

An original application contains two separable items, one held by the receiving authority and another properly connected to a different authority. The response can require partial handling and appropriate transfer. The student should identify each item and event rather than reject the whole request because one part belongs elsewhere.

5. Ordinary response and life or liberty

Section 7(1) generally requires the relevant provision of information or reasoned rejection within thirty days of receipt, subject to the specified qualifications. Information concerning life or liberty has the forty-eight-hour rule. Merely describing a request as urgent does not automatically establish that category; examine the actual facts and applicable interpretation.

Failure to give the relevant decision within the period has the deemed-refusal consequence under section 7(2). It does not mean every requested document becomes automatically non-exempt or that a private person can impose a penalty without the statutory decision process. Consequences and remedies must be kept distinct.

For a classroom event model, an ordinary receipt date is supplied and no special adjustment applies. A date tool can illustrate thirty elapsed days under its stated convention. If a life-or-liberty fact is introduced, the relevant legal clock differs; the tool must not continue using the ordinary model while merely changing the page heading.

6. Fees and the additional-fee interval

Section 7(3) requires the fee intimation to show the calculation and relevant review rights. The period between dispatch of the intimation and payment is excluded from the thirty-day computation as provided. A demand without a supported fee basis should not be assumed valid merely because it was sent before the original response date.

The Act provides the relevant below-poverty-line fee exemption and free provision where the public authority fails the section 7(1) time requirements in the stated framework. Fee rules also differ by applicable authority. Central-rule examples should not be presented as the fee schedule for every State authority.

For supplied arithmetic, twenty pages at an assumed applicable ₹2 per page give ₹40 copying charges. That does not establish whether the applicant is exempt, whether delay requires free information or whether a different format and rule applies. The calculator shows the supplied rate and assumptions rather than issuing an official fee demand.

7. Form of access and a reasoned rejection

Section 7 includes assistance for a sensorily disabled person and the rule concerning the requested form, subject to disproportionate resource diversion or harm to record safety or preservation. These qualifications should not become a blanket excuse to refuse all access. Identify the record, practical issue and legally supported alternative.

Where rejected, section 7(8) requires reasons, appeal period and appellate-authority particulars. A response saying confidential with no applicable provision or factual explanation can fail to communicate a reasoned decision. The authority should address each separable part and explain any lawful severance under section 10.

For an original letter-review exercise, identify missing elements in a refusal that gives neither the exemption nor appeal details. Correct the response structure without promising that the information must ultimately be disclosed. Procedural adequacy and substantive exemption are different questions; both require attention.

8. Third-party procedure

Section 11 requires the relevant notice to the third party within five days where the statutory confidential-information and intended-disclosure situation applies. The third party receives ten days from receipt to represent. The authority's decision period is forty days after receipt of the request within the provision, with notice of decision and appeal right.

These periods belong to different events. Do not simply add five, ten and forty as consecutive universal extensions. Nor does every document mentioning another person automatically require the same procedure without examining section 11's conditions. Identify why the provision applies and preserve the notice and response dates.

The third party's representation must be considered, but it is not an unconditional veto. The authority makes the statutory decision under the applicable grounds and public-interest qualifications. A bank protecting customer information should provide a supported representation where appropriate while recognising the competent process and available appeal.

9. First appeal

Section 19(1) provides the first appeal to an officer senior in rank to the PIO within thirty days from the relevant expiry or receipt of decision, with the sufficient-cause qualification. The triggering event differs between no response and an adverse decision. A generic application-date field is not enough to compute every appeal scenario.

The concerned third party's section 11 disclosure appeal has its specified thirty-day rule from the order. First appeals under the relevant subsections should be disposed of within thirty days or an extended total not exceeding forty-five days with recorded reasons under section 19(6). That disposal period is not the same as the appellant's filing period.

For a worked case, a requester receives a reasoned refusal and wants review of both exemption and fee. Identify the decision date, receipt and grounds. The appeal should address the actual issues and include relevant records. It is not necessary to invent a new request merely to challenge the existing decision through the proper route.

10. Second appeal and complaint

Section 19(3) provides second appeal to the appropriate Information Commission within ninety days from when the decision should have been made or was received, with its sufficient-cause provision. The Central and State routes depend on the authority and statutory framework; the applicant should not select a forum solely by convenience.

Section 18 gives the complaint and inquiry framework for specified access problems, including refusal to receive, no response, unreasonable fee and incomplete or misleading information. Complaint and appeal have distinct statutory functions and judicial treatment. They should not be described as identical remedies whose labels can always be swapped without consequence.

A student should identify what relief is sought and the proper route under current law. If the objective is disclosure after a refusal, examine the appellate framework rather than assume a complaint automatically produces every desired access order. The case exercise rewards correct classification and evidence, not an unsupported guarantee of outcome.

11. Powers and orders of the Commission

The Commission has the specified inquiry powers, including relevant civil-court-like powers and access to records within section 18. Section 19's decision powers include requiring compliance steps, disclosure, appointment or publication measures, record-management changes, training, compensation where applicable and penalties under their own provision. These are competent statutory decisions, not powers of an ordinary branch officer.

The onus of justifying denial in an appeal lies on the PIO under section 19(5). A reasoned file should therefore preserve the ground, evidence, search and consideration of relevant qualifications. A later general assertion cannot replace the original facts and legal basis indefinitely.

The Commission's decision is binding within the statutory framework. Judicial review and other applicable legal questions require their proper route; do not invent an ordinary appeal mechanism by borrowing one from a different tribunal. The authority should implement the actual order and retain proof, rather than mark the matter closed when the order is merely received.

12. Penalty and disciplinary recommendation

Section 20 provides ₹250 per day up to ₹25,000 for the specified conduct where the Commission makes the required finding, with reasonable opportunity to be heard and the PIO's burden concerning reasonable and diligent action. It is not an automatic bill that every applicant can impose for any delay.

The section includes conduct such as refusal to receive without reasonable cause, delay, mala fide denial, knowingly incorrect or misleading information, destruction or obstruction within its terms. Persistent failure can lead to the relevant disciplinary recommendation under section 20(2). Penalty, compensation and disciplinary action are distinct concepts.

For a conditional model, forty established chargeable days at ₹250 give ₹10,000, while 120 such days reach the ₹25,000 cap rather than ₹30,000. The model assumes the legal finding and chargeable period; it does not make them. The user must not confuse elapsed calendar days with the period the Commission lawfully determines.

13. Worked event timeline

An ordinary request is received, a valid additional-fee intimation is dispatched and payment arrives later. The student should identify the statutory excluded interval and the original response framework. Do not add every internal forwarding delay or staff absence as a new exclusion. The source of each adjustment must be stated.

Now vary the request to a qualifying third-party procedure. The forty-day decision framework and third-party representation events require their own analysis. A worksheet using only receipt plus thirty days is incomplete, but simply adding all visible periods together can also be wrong. Build the event sequence before choosing arithmetic.

The learning tool deliberately displays an assumed base period and supported excluded days, with no universal final legal date. It states the start-day convention and rejects invalid or reversed dates. The law determines which event and adjustment count; the tool helps students see the calculation after those assumptions are made.

14. Worked response audit and revision

A bank's refusal letter cites no exemption, gives no appeal details and includes an unexplained copying fee. Review procedural adequacy, fee basis and substantive disclosure separately. Correcting the appeal paragraph does not prove the exemption, and reversing the fee does not automatically require every protected record to be released.

A second file has a valid disclosure order but no evidence that the records were supplied. An internal approval is not completed compliance. Preserve dispatch, delivery and the actual disclosed version, including any authorised redaction. A decision and its implementation are different stages requiring different evidence.

For revision, use request, recipient, category, transfer, fee interval, decision, first appeal, second appeal and competent penalty. The major traps are mixing clocks, treating urgency as automatically life-or-liberty, making third-party objection a veto and presenting ₹250-per-day arithmetic as an imposed penalty. A complete answer identifies the governing event and conditions before using a numerical period.

15. A timeline with two different procedural adjustments

Assume an ordinary request is received through an assistant public information officer and later attracts a properly issued additional-fee intimation. The assistant-officer provision adds five days for the relevant response computation. The fee rule excludes the interval between dispatch of the intimation and payment from the specified thirty-day computation. These are different adjustments with different evidence; do not merge them into one invented universal forty-day response rule.

For a simplified exercise, the supplied relevant fee interval is six elapsed days. A worksheet may display the ordinary thirty-day base, the assumed five-day assistant-officer addition and the six-day fee interval separately. The arithmetic is forty-one, but that display does not certify the actual final calendar date. Receipt rules, the exact case category, service and any other applicable conditions still require examination.

Life-or-liberty information has its forty-eight-hour rule. The third-party process has its own forty-day decision framework when applicable. These categories cannot be selected simply to obtain the longest available period. The facts triggering the route must be established. A transfer to another authority also has a distinct five-day requirement and should not be confused with internal movement between desks.

Penalty model, not an order40 qualifying days x 250 =10,000. 120 days: apply 25,000 cap after calculationPenalty model, not an order40 qualifying days x 250 =10,000120 days: apply 25,000 cap aftercalculationClerk2Officer · original teaching diagram · conditional examples
Penalty model, not an order: 40 qualifying days x 250 =10,000. 120 days: apply 25,000 cap after calculation.

16. Appeals, costs and penalties are not the same remedy

Assume the authority rejects a request on day twenty with reasons and appellate particulars. The applicant's first-appeal analysis uses the statutory receipt or decision context, rather than waiting for an arbitrary ninetieth day. A first appeal ordinarily has a thirty-day filing framework, with sufficient-cause treatment; disposal is ordinarily thirty days with a reasoned extension to a total of forty-five. Second appeal uses a separate ninety-day framework.

Now assume information is supplied late without a valid basis for delay. Section 7(6)'s free-information consequence and section 20's personal penalty are separate questions. The applicant should not calculate a penalty and deduct it unilaterally from an unrelated bank liability. The Commission determines the statutory penalty after the required findings and opportunity, with the burden concerning reasonable and diligent action on the officer as provided.

In the classroom penalty model, forty qualifying days at ₹250 give ₹10,000. One hundred and twenty qualifying days would arithmetically give ₹30,000 before applying the ₹25,000 statutory cap, so the model output is ₹25,000. Neither figure proves that all the days qualify or that the Commission must impose the maximum. Compensation and disciplinary recommendation are different statutory consequences.

For fees, establish the applicable Central or State rules rather than applying an old online table indiscriminately. A supplied copying-rate exercise may teach multiplication, but its assumptions should be visible. An authority cannot justify an unsupported fee merely by calling it processing cost. The notice should show the calculation and review route as required.

The adverse response audit asks whether the applicant received the actual decision, reasons, access details and appellate information. A letter saying disposed in an internal portal is not necessarily adequate communication. Preserve the dispatch or delivery evidence, supplied records and fee history so that the appeal can examine what happened rather than reconstruct it from a final status label.

Work the numbers

Open the relevant worked calculator. Establish the legal inputs and assumptions first. The model does not decide liability or grant approval.

Apply the chapter

An APIO receipt and a later fee intimation both appear in the timeline. Which conclusion should guide the review?
Choose an action.
Worked reasoning

Assistant-officer routing and a fee interval are different adjustments. Assistant-officer routing and a fee interval are different adjustments. They create a universal 40-day response rule. is the unsupported alternative. Read the worked examples and relevant rule before acting; the assumed figures do not decide legal entitlement.

Practice: 25 explained questions

Answers can be saved in this browser.

Choose answers, then check.

1. An APIO receipt and a later fee intimation both appear in the timeline. I: Assistant-officer routing and a fee interval are different adjustments. II: They create a universal 40-day response rule. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

D. Only I is supported.

I (Assistant-officer routing and a fee interval are different adjustments.) is supported; II (They create a universal 40-day response rule.) is not supported. The governing distinction is: Assistant-officer routing and a fee interval are different adjustments. Reject the alternative claim: They create a universal 40-day response rule. Assume an ordinary request is received through an assistant public information officer and later attracts a properly issued additional-fee intimation. The assistant-officer provision adds five days for the relevant response computation. The fee rule excludes the interval between dispatch of the intimation and payment from the specified thirty-day computation. These are different adjustments with different evidence; do not merge them into one invented universal forty-day response rule. Section 5 provides the assistant-information-officer receiving and forwarding role and adds five days in computing the section 7 response period in the stated situation. An assistant's receipt should therefore be recorded accurately. The added period is not a general five-day extension available to every delayed request.

2. A supported life-or-liberty request arrives. I: The authority may choose an ordinary period merely for convenience. II: Life-or-liberty requests have a 48-hour rule. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

A. Only II is supported.

I (The authority may choose an ordinary period merely for convenience.) is not supported; II (Life-or-liberty requests have a 48-hour rule.) is supported. The governing distinction is: Life-or-liberty requests have a 48-hour rule. Reject the alternative claim: The authority may choose an ordinary period merely for convenience. Life-or-liberty information has its forty-eight-hour rule. The third-party process has its own forty-day decision framework when applicable. These categories cannot be selected simply to obtain the longest available period. The facts triggering the route must be established. A transfer to another authority also has a distinct five-day requirement and should not be confused with internal movement between desks. Section 7(1) generally requires the relevant provision of information or reasoned rejection within thirty days of receipt, subject to the specified qualifications. Information concerning life or liberty has the forty-eight-hour rule. Merely describing a request as urgent does not automatically establish that category; examine the actual facts and applicable interpretation.

3. A qualifying third-party consultation is initiated. I: Third-party procedure has its own 40-day decision framework. II: Five,ten and forty must always be stacked as 55 days. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

D. Only I is supported.

I (Third-party procedure has its own 40-day decision framework.) is supported; II (Five,ten and forty must always be stacked as 55 days.) is not supported. The governing distinction is: Third-party procedure has its own 40-day decision framework. Reject the alternative claim: Five,ten and forty must always be stacked as 55 days. Section 11 requires the relevant notice to the third party within five days where the statutory confidential-information and intended-disclosure situation applies. The third party receives ten days from receipt to represent. The authority's decision period is forty days after receipt of the request within the provision, with notice of decision and appeal right. Now vary the request to a qualifying third-party procedure. The forty-day decision framework and third-party representation events require their own analysis. A worksheet using only receipt plus thirty days is incomplete, but simply adding all visible periods together can also be wrong. Build the event sequence before choosing arithmetic.

4. A penalty exercise supplies forty qualifying days. I: That arithmetic itself imposes the penalty. II: Forty qualifying penalty days model 10,000 at 250 per day. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

B. Only II is supported.

I (That arithmetic itself imposes the penalty.) is not supported; II (Forty qualifying penalty days model 10,000 at 250 per day.) is supported. The governing distinction is: Forty qualifying penalty days model 10,000 at 250 per day. Reject the alternative claim: That arithmetic itself imposes the penalty. In the classroom penalty model, forty qualifying days at ₹250 give ₹10,000. One hundred and twenty qualifying days would arithmetically give ₹30,000 before applying the ₹25,000 statutory cap, so the model output is ₹25,000. Neither figure proves that all the days qualify or that the Commission must impose the maximum. Compensation and disciplinary recommendation are different statutory consequences. Now vary the request to a qualifying third-party procedure. The forty-day decision framework and third-party representation events require their own analysis. A worksheet using only receipt plus thirty days is incomplete, but simply adding all visible periods together can also be wrong. Build the event sequence before choosing arithmetic.

5. A penalty exercise supplies 120 qualifying days. I: One hundred twenty qualifying days are capped at 25,000 in the penalty model. II: The relevant languages include English,Hindi or official area language. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

C. Both I and II are supported.

I (One hundred twenty qualifying days are capped at 25,000 in the penalty model.) is supported; II (The relevant languages include English,Hindi or official area language.) is supported. The governing distinction is: One hundred twenty qualifying days are capped at 25,000 in the penalty model. Reject the alternative claim: The model must always award 30,000. In the classroom penalty model, forty qualifying days at ₹250 give ₹10,000. One hundred and twenty qualifying days would arithmetically give ₹30,000 before applying the ₹25,000 statutory cap, so the model output is ₹25,000. Neither figure proves that all the days qualify or that the Commission must impose the maximum. Compensation and disciplinary recommendation are different statutory consequences. Section 6 permits a written or electronic request in English, Hindi or the official language of the area, with prescribed fee and particulars of the information sought. Where the person cannot make the request in writing, reasonable assistance is required to reduce the oral request to writing. Accessibility is part of the framework, not an optional favour.

6. D26 review note: “A commercial motive statement is always mandatory.” Which replacement accurately corrects this conclusion?
Answer and explanation

A. Applicants need not give reasons for seeking information.

The supported correction is: Applicants need not give reasons for seeking information. The quoted conclusion is not supported. The governing distinction is: Applicants need not give reasons for seeking information. Reject the alternative claim: A commercial motive statement is always mandatory. The applicant need not provide reasons or unnecessary personal details beyond contact needs. The authority should help identify a reasonably described record rather than insist on a commercial motive statement. However, the request must identify the information sought; RTI does not automatically require a new expert report answering an undefined grievance. For supplied arithmetic, twenty pages at an assumed applicable ₹2 per page give ₹40 copying charges. That does not establish whether the applicant is exempt, whether delay requires free information or whether a different format and rule applies. The calculator shows the supplied rate and assumptions rather than issuing an official fee demand.

7. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Only professionally drafted typed requests are valid. II: Transfer may always be delayed indefinitely. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

B. Neither I nor II is supported.

I (Only professionally drafted typed requests are valid.) is not supported; II (Transfer may always be delayed indefinitely.) is not supported. The governing distinction is: Oral assistance can be required for an applicant unable to write. Reject the alternative claim: Only professionally drafted typed requests are valid. Section 6 permits a written or electronic request in English, Hindi or the official language of the area, with prescribed fee and particulars of the information sought. Where the person cannot make the request in writing, reasonable assistance is required to reduce the oral request to writing. Accessibility is part of the framework, not an optional favour. Distinguish transfer between public authorities from internal forwarding within one authority. The legal source and responsibility can differ. A bank should not call every internal email a statutory transfer or assume that a transfer permits it to abandon the parts of the request it properly holds.

8. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: The relevant languages include English,Hindi or official area language. II: Only English can ever be accepted. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

C. Only I is supported.

I (The relevant languages include English,Hindi or official area language.) is supported; II (Only English can ever be accepted.) is not supported. The governing distinction is: The relevant languages include English,Hindi or official area language. Reject the alternative claim: Only English can ever be accepted. Section 6 permits a written or electronic request in English, Hindi or the official language of the area, with prescribed fee and particulars of the information sought. Where the person cannot make the request in writing, reasonable assistance is required to reduce the oral request to writing. Accessibility is part of the framework, not an optional favour. For a worked case, a requester receives a reasoned refusal and wants review of both exemption and fee. Identify the decision date, receipt and grounds. The appeal should address the actual issues and include relevant records. It is not necessary to invent a new request merely to challenge the existing decision through the proper route.

9. D26 review note: “It is identical to every transfer period.” Which replacement accurately corrects this conclusion?
Answer and explanation

A. APIO receipt has a statutory five-day addition.

The supported correction is: APIO receipt has a statutory five-day addition. The quoted conclusion is not supported. The governing distinction is: APIO receipt has a statutory five-day addition. Reject the alternative claim: It is identical to every transfer period. Section 5 provides the assistant-information-officer receiving and forwarding role and adds five days in computing the section 7 response period in the stated situation. An assistant's receipt should therefore be recorded accurately. The added period is not a general five-day extension available to every delayed request. Section 11 requires the relevant notice to the third party within five days where the statutory confidential-information and intended-disclosure situation applies. The third party receives ten days from receipt to represent. The authority's decision period is forty days after receipt of the request within the provision, with notice of decision and appeal right.

10. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Internal assistance has deemed-PIO consequences within the rule. II: No response can amount to deemed refusal. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

C. Both I and II are supported.

I (Internal assistance has deemed-PIO consequences within the rule.) is supported; II (No response can amount to deemed refusal.) is supported. The governing distinction is: Internal assistance has deemed-PIO consequences within the rule. Reject the alternative claim: Assisting officers can never have statutory responsibility. The PIO can seek assistance from another officer, who has the statutory duty and relevant deemed-PIO consequence for contravention under section 5(5). A bank's internal allocation should make the request, record owner and return date clear. Passing the file around informally does not suspend the legal process indefinitely. Failure to give the relevant decision within the period has the deemed-refusal consequence under section 7(2). It does not mean every requested document becomes automatically non-exempt or that a private person can impose a penalty without the statutory decision process. Consequences and remedies must be kept distinct.

11. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Transfer may always be delayed indefinitely. II: Relevant authority transfer should occur as soon as practicable within five days. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

B. Only II is supported.

I (Transfer may always be delayed indefinitely.) is not supported; II (Relevant authority transfer should occur as soon as practicable within five days.) is supported. The governing distinction is: Relevant authority transfer should occur as soon as practicable within five days. Reject the alternative claim: Transfer may always be delayed indefinitely. Section 6(3) requires transfer where the information is held by another public authority or the subject is more closely connected with its functions, with immediate information to the applicant and transfer as soon as practicable and no later than five days from receipt. It also permits the appropriate part to be transferred. Section 5 provides the assistant-information-officer receiving and forwarding role and adds five days in computing the section 7 response period in the stated situation. An assistant's receipt should therefore be recorded accurately. The added period is not a general five-day extension available to every delayed request.

12. D26 review note: “Every request always has ninety days at first instance.” Which replacement accurately corrects this conclusion?
Answer and explanation

C. Ordinary response is generally thirty days.

The supported correction is: Ordinary response is generally thirty days. The quoted conclusion is not supported. The governing distinction is: Ordinary response is generally thirty days. Reject the alternative claim: Every request always has ninety days at first instance. Section 7(1) generally requires the relevant provision of information or reasoned rejection within thirty days of receipt, subject to the specified qualifications. Information concerning life or liberty has the forty-eight-hour rule. Merely describing a request as urgent does not automatically establish that category; examine the actual facts and applicable interpretation. A request reaches an assistant information officer, is transferred to another authority and later receives a fee intimation. A worksheet simply adds thirty days to the first date and declares the authority late. That calculation may ignore legally relevant events. RTI has several specific response and appeal rules, so the procedural stage and facts must be established first.

13. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Silence automatically discloses every exempt record. II: No response can amount to deemed refusal. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

C. Only II is supported.

I (Silence automatically discloses every exempt record.) is not supported; II (No response can amount to deemed refusal.) is supported. The governing distinction is: No response can amount to deemed refusal. Reject the alternative claim: Silence automatically discloses every exempt record. Failure to give the relevant decision within the period has the deemed-refusal consequence under section 7(2). It does not mean every requested document becomes automatically non-exempt or that a private person can impose a penalty without the statutory decision process. Consequences and remedies must be kept distinct. A bank's refusal letter cites no exemption, gives no appeal details and includes an unexplained copying fee. Review procedural adequacy, fee basis and substantive disclosure separately. Correcting the appeal paragraph does not prove the exemption, and reversing the fee does not automatically require every protected record to be released.

14. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Any unexplained total is necessarily valid. II: Section 7(9) is a blanket exemption from all disclosure. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

A. Neither I nor II is supported.

I (Any unexplained total is necessarily valid.) is not supported; II (Section 7(9) is a blanket exemption from all disclosure.) is not supported. The governing distinction is: Fee intimation must show the relevant calculation and review route. Reject the alternative claim: Any unexplained total is necessarily valid. Section 7(3) requires the fee intimation to show the calculation and relevant review rights. The period between dispatch of the intimation and payment is excluded from the thirty-day computation as provided. A demand without a supported fee basis should not be assumed valid merely because it was sent before the original response date. A bank's refusal letter cites no exemption, gives no appeal details and includes an unexplained copying fee. Review procedural adequacy, fee basis and substantive disclosure separately. Correcting the appeal paragraph does not prove the exemption, and reversing the fee does not automatically require every protected record to be released.

15. D26 review note: “It always restarts every response clock from zero.” Which replacement accurately corrects this conclusion?
Answer and explanation

D. The fee interval has specified exclusion treatment.

The supported correction is: The fee interval has specified exclusion treatment. The quoted conclusion is not supported. The governing distinction is: The fee interval has specified exclusion treatment. Reject the alternative claim: It always restarts every response clock from zero. Section 7(3) requires the fee intimation to show the calculation and relevant review rights. The period between dispatch of the intimation and payment is excluded from the thirty-day computation as provided. A demand without a supported fee basis should not be assumed valid merely because it was sent before the original response date. Section 7 includes assistance for a sensorily disabled person and the rule concerning the requested form, subject to disproportionate resource diversion or harm to record safety or preservation. These qualifications should not become a blanket excuse to refuse all access. Identify the record, practical issue and legally supported alternative.

16. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Every requester must always pay every fee. II: BPL fee exemption has its statutory framework. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

A. Only II is supported.

I (Every requester must always pay every fee.) is not supported; II (BPL fee exemption has its statutory framework.) is supported. The governing distinction is: BPL fee exemption has its statutory framework. Reject the alternative claim: Every requester must always pay every fee. The Act provides the relevant below-poverty-line fee exemption and free provision where the public authority fails the section 7(1) time requirements in the stated framework. Fee rules also differ by applicable authority. Central-rule examples should not be presented as the fee schedule for every State authority. An ordinary request is received, a valid additional-fee intimation is dispatched and payment arrives later. The student should identify the statutory excluded interval and the original response framework. Do not add every internal forwarding delay or staff absence as a new exclusion. The source of each adjustment must be stated.

17. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Late supply and free information have section 7(6) treatment. II: All lateness automatically proves maximum personal penalty. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

D. Only I is supported.

I (Late supply and free information have section 7(6) treatment.) is supported; II (All lateness automatically proves maximum personal penalty.) is not supported. The governing distinction is: Late supply and free information have section 7(6) treatment. Reject the alternative claim: All lateness automatically proves maximum personal penalty. Now assume information is supplied late without a valid basis for delay. Section 7(6)'s free-information consequence and section 20's personal penalty are separate questions. The applicant should not calculate a penalty and deduct it unilaterally from an unrelated bank liability. The Commission determines the statutory penalty after the required findings and opportunity, with the burden concerning reasonable and diligent action on the officer as provided. Section 18 gives the complaint and inquiry framework for specified access problems, including refusal to receive, no response, unreasonable fee and incomplete or misleading information. Complaint and appeal have distinct statutory functions and judicial treatment. They should not be described as identical remedies whose labels can always be swapped without consequence.

18. D26 review note: “Section 7(9) is a blanket exemption from all disclosure.” Which replacement accurately corrects this conclusion?
Answer and explanation

D. Requested form has disproportionate-resource and safety qualifications.

The supported correction is: Requested form has disproportionate-resource and safety qualifications. The quoted conclusion is not supported. The governing distinction is: Requested form has disproportionate-resource and safety qualifications. Reject the alternative claim: Section 7(9) is a blanket exemption from all disclosure. Section 7 includes assistance for a sensorily disabled person and the rule concerning the requested form, subject to disproportionate resource diversion or harm to record safety or preservation. These qualifications should not become a blanket excuse to refuse all access. Identify the record, practical issue and legally supported alternative. Failure to give the relevant decision within the period has the deemed-refusal consequence under section 7(2). It does not mean every requested document becomes automatically non-exempt or that a private person can impose a penalty without the statutory decision process. Consequences and remedies must be kept distinct.

19. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Rejection should include reasons and appeal particulars. II: An internal disposed label is always sufficient communication. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

B. Only I is supported.

I (Rejection should include reasons and appeal particulars.) is supported; II (An internal disposed label is always sufficient communication.) is not supported. The governing distinction is: Rejection should include reasons and appeal particulars. Reject the alternative claim: An internal disposed label is always sufficient communication. The adverse response audit asks whether the applicant received the actual decision, reasons, access details and appellate information. A letter saying disposed in an internal portal is not necessarily adequate communication. Preserve the dispatch or delivery evidence, supplied records and fee history so that the appeal can examine what happened rather than reconstruct it from a final status label. The concerned third party's section 11 disclosure appeal has its specified thirty-day rule from the order. First appeals under the relevant subsections should be disposed of within thirty days or an extended total not exceeding forty-five days with recorded reasons under section 19(6). That disposal period is not the same as the appellant's filing period.

20. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Third-party notice and representation have distinct periods. II: Second appeal has a distinct ninety-day framework. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

B. Both I and II are supported.

I (Third-party notice and representation have distinct periods.) is supported; II (Second appeal has a distinct ninety-day framework.) is supported. The governing distinction is: Third-party notice and representation have distinct periods. Reject the alternative claim: The third party receives an automatic indefinite veto. Section 11 requires the relevant notice to the third party within five days where the statutory confidential-information and intended-disclosure situation applies. The third party receives ten days from receipt to represent. The authority's decision period is forty days after receipt of the request within the provision, with notice of decision and appeal right. Section 19(3) provides second appeal to the appropriate Information Commission within ninety days from when the decision should have been made or was received, with its sufficient-cause provision. The Central and State routes depend on the authority and statutory framework; the applicant should not select a forum solely by convenience.

21. D26 review note: “There is never any late-appeal consideration.” Which replacement accurately corrects this conclusion?
Answer and explanation

C. First appeal has a thirty-day filing framework with sufficient-cause treatment.

The supported correction is: First appeal has a thirty-day filing framework with sufficient-cause treatment. The quoted conclusion is not supported. The governing distinction is: First appeal has a thirty-day filing framework with sufficient-cause treatment. Reject the alternative claim: There is never any late-appeal consideration. Section 19(1) provides the first appeal to an officer senior in rank to the PIO within thirty days from the relevant expiry or receipt of decision, with the sufficient-cause qualification. The triggering event differs between no response and an adverse decision. A generic application-date field is not enough to compute every appeal scenario. The onus of justifying denial in an appeal lies on the PIO under section 19(5). A reasoned file should therefore preserve the ground, evidence, search and consideration of relevant qualifications. A later general assertion cannot replace the original facts and legal basis indefinitely.

22. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: It can always extend without limit silently. II: First-appeal disposal can extend to 45 days with written reasons. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

A. Only II is supported.

I (It can always extend without limit silently.) is not supported; II (First-appeal disposal can extend to 45 days with written reasons.) is supported. The governing distinction is: First-appeal disposal can extend to 45 days with written reasons. Reject the alternative claim: It can always extend without limit silently. The concerned third party's section 11 disclosure appeal has its specified thirty-day rule from the order. First appeals under the relevant subsections should be disposed of within thirty days or an extended total not exceeding forty-five days with recorded reasons under section 19(6). That disposal period is not the same as the appellant's filing period. Assume the authority rejects a request on day twenty with reasons and appellate particulars. The applicant's first-appeal analysis uses the statutory receipt or decision context, rather than waiting for an arbitrary ninetieth day. A first appeal ordinarily has a thirty-day filing framework, with sufficient-cause treatment; disposal is ordinarily thirty days with a reasoned extension to a total of forty-five. Second appeal uses a separate ninety-day framework.

23. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Second appeal has a distinct ninety-day framework. II: It is identical to the first appeal in every period. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

B. Only I is supported.

I (Second appeal has a distinct ninety-day framework.) is supported; II (It is identical to the first appeal in every period.) is not supported. The governing distinction is: Second appeal has a distinct ninety-day framework. Reject the alternative claim: It is identical to the first appeal in every period. Section 19(3) provides second appeal to the appropriate Information Commission within ninety days from when the decision should have been made or was received, with its sufficient-cause provision. The Central and State routes depend on the authority and statutory framework; the applicant should not select a forum solely by convenience. Assume the authority rejects a request on day twenty with reasons and appellate particulars. The applicant's first-appeal analysis uses the statutory receipt or decision context, rather than waiting for an arbitrary ninetieth day. A first appeal ordinarily has a thirty-day filing framework, with sufficient-cause treatment; disposal is ordinarily thirty days with a reasoned extension to a total of forty-five. Second appeal uses a separate ninety-day framework.

24. D26 review note: “The applicant can impose and collect it personally.” Which replacement accurately corrects this conclusion?
Answer and explanation

A. The Commission determines penalty after the required process.

The supported correction is: The Commission determines penalty after the required process. The quoted conclusion is not supported. The governing distinction is: The Commission determines penalty after the required process. Reject the alternative claim: The applicant can impose and collect it personally. Section 20 provides ₹250 per day up to ₹25,000 for the specified conduct where the Commission makes the required finding, with reasonable opportunity to be heard and the PIO's burden concerning reasonable and diligent action. It is not an automatic bill that every applicant can impose for any delay. Now assume information is supplied late without a valid basis for delay. Section 7(6)'s free-information consequence and section 20's personal penalty are separate questions. The applicant should not calculate a penalty and deduct it unilaterally from an unrelated bank liability. The Commission determines the statutory penalty after the required findings and opportunity, with the burden concerning reasonable and diligent action on the officer as provided.

25. D26: assess the proposed legal analysis. I: Third-party procedure has its own 40-day decision framework. II: Compensation,penalty and disciplinary recommendation differ. Which assessment follows the chapter rules?
Answer and explanation

B. Both I and II are supported.

I (Third-party procedure has its own 40-day decision framework.) is supported; II (Compensation,penalty and disciplinary recommendation differ.) is supported. The governing distinction is: Compensation,penalty and disciplinary recommendation differ. Reject the alternative claim: They are one interchangeable amount paid automatically. The Commission has the specified inquiry powers, including relevant civil-court-like powers and access to records within section 18. Section 19's decision powers include requiring compliance steps, disclosure, appointment or publication measures, record-management changes, training, compensation where applicable and penalties under their own provision. These are competent statutory decisions, not powers of an ordinary branch officer. Now vary the request to a qualifying third-party procedure. The forty-day decision framework and third-party representation events require their own analysis. A worksheet using only receipt plus thirty days is incomplete, but simply adding all visible periods together can also be wrong. Build the event sequence before choosing arithmetic.

Official references and review

Original examples. Academic acceptance, operative-source reconciliation and website UAT remain required; see the source-gap register.

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